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Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2004) (hereafter CEE) and Smets and
Wouters (2003) (SW) have developed Dynamic Stochastic General Equilib-
rium models of the US and euro area economies that have become standard
tools for monetary policy analysis. These models have been designed to re-
￿ ect the empirical properties of the US and euro area data in a way that is
consistent with New Keynesian theory. In particular these models have been
shown to replicate the impulse-response functions of output and in￿ ation to
a monetary policy shock. Central to these models is the Calvo model of price
and wage setting with indexation developed by Erceg, Henderson and Levin
(2000)(EHL): ￿rms (unions) have a constant probability to be able to opti-
mally reset prices (wages); when ￿rms (unions) do not optimally reset prices
(wages), the nominal price (wage) is automaticaly updated in response to
in￿ ation.1 This approach is however inconsistent with the micro-data along
two dimensions. First, it assumes that the probability of price reoptimization
is constant over time. Second, it implies that nominal wages and prices adjust
every period, which is counterfactual as noted e.g. by Cogley and Sbordone
(2008) and Dixon and Kara (2010).
The purpose of this paper is to take seriously the recent micro-data ev-
idence on wages and prices and apply it directly to alternative wage and
pricing models. Our main point of departure is the aggregate distribution of
durations of price and wage spells. In steady-state, this can be represented
in three di⁄erent ways: the Hazard pro￿le, the distribution of durations,
and the cross-sectional distribution (see Dixon 2009 for a detailed explana-
tion). We take the Hazard pro￿le and use this to calibrate a Generalized
Calvo (GC) model with duration-dependent reset probabilities.2 We take
the cross-sectional distribution of completed spells and use this to calibrate
a Generalized Taylor Economy (GTE) in which there are several sectors,
each with a simple Taylor contract but with contract lengths di⁄ering across
sectors3. Each of the two models we consider (GC and GTE) exactly re￿ ects
the full distribution of durations revealed by the micro-data. We also consider
1In EHL, the indexation is to the unconditional mean in￿ ation, while in SW and CEE
it is to lagged in￿ ation
2The GC approach has been adopted by Wolman (1999), Guerrieri (2006), Dixon
(2009).
3References for the GT price setting model include Taylor (1993), Dixon and Kara
(2005, 2010), Coenen et al. (2007).
2the simple Calvo model with the reset probability calibrated by the average
proportion of wages or prices changing in the data.
In order to carry out a quantitative experiment, we use original micro data
on wages and prices in France. Whilst the data on prices has been well studied
for a range of countries (Dhyne et al. 2006, Klenow and Malin, 2010), relevant
wage data are harder to ￿nd. We are here able to use a unique, quarterly
data set on wages from France (Heckel, Le Bihan, Montornes, 2008). Our
approach is then to substitute the standard Calvo scheme with one based
on the micro-data using the GC and GTE pricing models and investigate
how far these approaches work when set in the SW model of the euro area
economy. While we use data for one country of the euro area (France), we
would argue they are a relevant proxy for the whole euro area, for which
similar hazard function are not available. Comparative evidence for prices
does indeed suggest that there is a large degree of similarity across the larger
euro area economies (Dhyne et al. 2006). Finally, we are able to study macro
dynamics, in particular the response to a monetary policy shock.
With respect to previous research that has used GC or GT models (e.g.
Wolman 1999, Coenen et al. 2007, Dixon and Kara 2010, Kara 2010), our
speci￿c contribution is twofold. First, we use direct evidence on the actual
distribution of both wages and price durations. By contrast, previous research
has used either only a few moments of these distributions or indirectly es-
timated distributions. Second we derive a model of wage-setting with GT
and GC contracts, which builds on the EHL model. This extends the EHL
framework to a more general and ￿ exible structure of wage-rigidity than has
been considered previously.
Our exercise is to a large extent an analytical one: the SW and CEE
models and their clones rely on indexation to generate some of the features
that make the models congruent with the macro-data: in particular, the
degree of persistence in output and in￿ ation in response to monetary shocks
and the "hump shape" found in the macro-data. Since indexation is largely
at odds with the micro-data, we want to see how far we can go keeping
the SW=CEE framework but replacing indexation with a more rigorously
micro-data based approach to pricing. Our main result is that using these
alternative frameworks we can partly replicate the persistence of in￿ ation
and output following shocks without relying on indexation. In particular the
Generalized Taylor model is shown to be able to produce a hump-shaped
response of in￿ ation and output to monetary policy shocks, which does not
happen with the Calvo based approaches. In contrast, we ￿nd that all three
3approaches lead to similar responses to a productivity shock.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops GT and
GC models of price and wage setting. Section 3 presents our micro data
on price and wages and uses the distribution of durations to calibrate these
models. Section 4 embeds these calibrated GC and GT price and wage-
setting schemes into the Smets and Wouters model of the euro area economy,
and studies the implications for the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Price and Wage -setting in GT and GC
economies
Standard time-dependent models of price rigidity have restrictive implica-
tions for the distribution of durations. The standard Taylor model predicts
that all durations are identical. The standard Calvo (constant hazard) model
predicts that durations are distributed according to the exponential distri-
bution. In this paper, we consider the Generalized Taylor and Generalized
Calvo set-ups which allow the distribution of durations implied by the pric-
ing model to be exactly the same as the distribution found in the actual
micro-data. The distribution of durations can be characterized in various
ways. As shown in Dixon (2009), in steady-state there are a set of iden-
tities that link the Hazard function and the cross-sectional distribution of
completed contracts lengths. These are just di⁄erent ways of looking at the
same data. However, the Hazard function relates naturally to the Generalized
Calvo model where the hazard rates are mapped on to duration dependent
price-reset probabilities. The cross-section of completed price-spell lengths
is easily related to the Generalized Taylor model, where there are many sec-
tors, and within each sector there is a simple Taylor staggered contract which
di⁄er across sectors.
We will ￿rst outline the Generalized Taylor and Generalized Calvo economies
in terms of price-setting behavior. We will then see how this applies to wage-
setting.
2.1 Generalized Taylor Economy (GTE)
In the Generalized Taylor Economy (GTE) there are N sectors, i = 1;:::;N:
In sector i there are i￿period contracts: each period a cohort of i￿1 of the
4￿rms in the sector sets a new price (or wage). If we think of the economy
as a continuum of ￿rms, we can describe the GTE as a vector of sector
shares: ￿i is the proportion of ￿rms that have price-spells of length i. If
the longest observed price-spell is F, then we have
PF
i=1 ￿i = 1 and ￿ =
(￿1;:::;￿F) is the F-vector of shares. We can think of the "sectors" as
"duration sectors", de￿ned by the length of price-spells. The essence of the
Taylor model is that when they set the price, the ￿rm knows exactly how
long its price is going to last. The simple Taylor economy is a special case
where there is only one length of price-spell (e.g. ￿2 = 1 is a simple Taylor
"2 quarter" economy). The GTE is based on the cross-sectional distribution
of completed spell lengths: hence it can also be called the distribution across
￿rms (DAF)in this context. The GTE has been developed in Taylor (1993),
Carvalho (1995), Dixon and Kara (2005, 2006, 2010), Coenen et al (2007)
and Kara (2010). The GTE can represent any steady-state distribution of
durations: hence it can be chosen to exactly re￿ ect the distribution found in
the micro-data.
The log-linearised equation for the aggregate price pt is a weighted average





In each sector i, a proportion i￿1 of the ￿i ￿rms reset their price at each
date. Assuming imperfect competition and standard demand curve, the op-
timal reset price in sector i; xit is given by the ￿rst-order condition of an
intertemporal pro￿t-maximisation program under the constraint implied by
price rigidity. The log-linearised equation for the reset price, as in the stan-














where ￿ is a discount factor, Et is the expectation operator conditional on
information available at date t , and p￿
t+k is the optimal ￿ ex price at time
t + k. The reset price is thus an average over the optimal ￿ ex prices for the
duration of the contract (or price-spell). The formula for the optimal ￿ ex
price will depend on the model: clearly, it is a markup on marginal cost. We
will specify the exact log-linearised equation for the optimal ￿ ex-price when
we specify the precise macreconomic model we use.







In each period, a proportion ￿ h of ￿rms reset their prices in this economy:







2.2 The Generalized Calvo Economy (GCE)
In the Generalized Calvo Economy (GCE), initially developed by Wolman
(1999), ￿rms have a common set of duration-dependent reset probabilities:
the probability of resetting price i periods after you last reset the price is given
by hi. This is a time-dependent model, and the pro￿le of reset probabilities
is h = fhig
F
i=1. Clearly, if F is the longest price-spell we have hF = 1 and
hi 2 [0;1) for i = 1:::F ￿ 1. Again, the duration data can be represented by
the hazard function. Estimated hazard function can then be used to calibrate
h. Since any distribution of durations can be represented by the appropriate
hazard function, we can choose the GCE to exactly ￿t micro-data.
In economic terms, the di⁄erence between the Calvo approach and the
Taylor approach is that when the ￿rm sets its price, it does not know how
long its price is going to last. Rather, it has a survivor function S(i) which
gives the probability that its price will last at up to i periods. The survivor
function in discrete time is4:




(1 ￿ hj) i = 2;:::;F
Thus, when they set the price in period t, the ￿rms know that they will last
one period with certainty, at least 2 periods with probability S(2) and so
4Note that the discrete time survivor function e⁄ectively assumes that all "failures"
occur at the end of the period (or the start of the next period): this corresponds to
the pricing models where the price is set for a whole period and can only change at the
transition from one period to the next.
6on. The Calvo model is a special case where the hazard is constant hi = ￿ h,
S(i) = (1￿￿ h)i￿1 and F = 1. Of course, in any actual data set, F is ￿nite. In
the applications which follow we set F = 20 quarters, close to the maximum
duration observed in price micro data.
In the GC model the reset price is common across all ￿rms that reset
their price. The optimal reset price, in the same monopolistic competition

















That is, the current price level is constituted by the surviving reset prices of
the present and last F periods.
2.3 Wage-setting.
We can apply GCE and GCT to wage data in order to calibrate wage-setting.
If we have a model with ￿ exible prices, simply using the same equations as
the price-setting model would probably be a relevant shortcut. Indeed as
was shown in Ascari (2003) and Edge (2002), models of either wage or price
rigidity lead to reduced-form dynamics that is largely similar for reasonable
parameter values. So, calibrating the models of sections 2:1 and 2:2 with
the distributions implied by the wage data would presumably be a relevant
strategy.
However, we also wish to provide a model that combines both wage and
price rigidity as in the models of Erceg et al. (2000), Christiano et al. (2005),
Smets and Wouters (2003). Clearly, the description of pricing decisions de-
scribed above will continue to hold. What we need to add are the speci￿c
equations for marginal cost with sticky wages. As in EHL, we take the craft-
union model ￿rst employed in the macroeconomic setting by Blanchard and
Kiyotaki (1987). In this case, there is a CES aggregator for labour inputs
with a speci￿c elasticity ￿w. There is a unit interval of households h 2 [0;1]
7each with a unique type of labour. Aggregate labour Lt is constituted of by
























We assume that the household preferences are described by the following





tU(Ct ￿ Ht;1 ￿ Lt(h))
where Ht = bCt￿1; b is a parameter describing habit formation, assumed
to be external, and Lt(h) is hours worked by household h. We specify the
functional form for U as:








where ￿c is the inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and ￿L is
the inverse of the elasticity of hours worked to the real wage rate.
We assume full-insurance so that the level of consumption will be equal
across households5. Employment is assumed to be demand determined:
hence the households marginal rate of substitution at time t is:
MRS(h)t = ￿
Ul(Ct ￿ bCt￿1;1 ￿ L(h)t)
UC(Ct ￿ bCt￿1;1 ￿ L(h)t)
=
(Ct ￿ bCt￿1)￿c
(1 ￿ Lt(h))￿L (9)
5See Ascari (2000) for the details.
8The union-household sets its nominal wage W(h)t. We can de￿ne the
"shadow nominal wage" as:
W
￿(h)t = Pt:MRS(h)t (10)
W ￿(h)t is nominal wage which would equate the real wage with the marginal
rate of substitution for household h given the labour which is demanded of
it at its current nominal wage W(h)t (from 8), and its current and past
consumption according to (9).
2.3.1 Wage-setting GTE.
Log-linearising these equations (9),(8),(10) we have:
mrs(h)t = ￿Ln(h)t +
￿c
1 ￿ b
(ct ￿ b:ct￿1) (11)
n(h)t = ￿w (wt ￿ w(h)t) + nt (12)
w
￿(h) = pt + mrst (13)
where lowercase letter are log-deviation and n(h)t is the log-deviation of
Lt(h): If the household-union knows the length of its contract to be i periods,
the (nominal) reset wage xw
it will ful￿ll w(h)t+k = xit for k = 0;:::;i ￿ 1.
The optimal reset wage is obtained by maximizing the intertemporal utility
function subject to this structure of wage stickiness, and a standard budget

















it is a weighted average of the discounted nominal shadow wages
w￿
t+k.
As shown in the appendix, using equations (11),(12),(13) it is straight-




















9Therefore we can construct a wage setting GTE: The aggregate wage is
related to the sectoral wages wit; where the weights ￿iw come from the cross-
sectional distribution across ￿rms in the data. The sectoral wages wit are













These equations can then be combined with the price-setting GTE equations
to simulate an economy with GT nominal rigidity in both price and wage
setting. Clearly, the wage-setting decision will depend directly on the level
of the aggregate variables (Lt;Ct) and indirectly on the rest of the variables
in the model.
2.3.2 Wage-setting GCE.
In the case of the GCE, we have the wage-survival function and related hazard
rates: Sw(i) and hw(i) i = 1;:::;Fw derived from the data on wages. The



































Again, this wage-setting GCE can be combined with price-rigidity. Note
that we can treat the Calvo model as a special case of the GCE. We can
10use the average proportion of wages reset each quarter as our calibration of
the Calvo reset probability: the resulting GCE is a constant hazard model
hw(i) = ￿ hw for i = 1:::Fw. In practice, we truncate the wage setting to a
maximum duration of 20 quarters, rather than having the in￿nite horizon
assumed by the theoretical Calvo model. The truncation at Fw = 20 has
almost no quantitative impact on the conclusions derived from the model
given that in our data ￿ hw = 0:38. Removing the in￿nite time horizon may
in any case be seen an improvement on the Calvo model.
Note that in the case of the constant hazard, equation, combining (19)
and (20) yields the "new Keynesian Phillips curve" formulation found in
SW 6, which writes the wage-setting equation in terms of price in￿ ation, wage
in￿ ation and the sum of current and future deviations of the real wage from
the MRS between consumption and leisure. Equation (19) is probably more
intuitive and easy to understand than the NKPC-like formulation. Note also
we have log-linearized the model around a zero in￿ ation rate steady-state (as
is the case in the NKPC formulations of CEE and SW) which means that the
wage and price levels are stationary: if there was non-zero in￿ ation in steady-
state, this would not be the case. However, as Ascari (2004) demonstrates,
this also invalidates traditional formulations of the NKPC.
3 The hazard function of price and wage changes:
micro evidence
This section describes the micro data we use to characterize the distribution
of wages and prices, and report some important statistics about this distri-
bution. We con￿ne ourselves to a brief description, since a more complete
description and details can be found in earlier papers.
3.1 Data
The dataset used in the case of prices is composed of the consumer price
quotes collected by the INSEE, the French Statistical Institute, to build
the CPI (Consumer Price Index). A detailed investigation of this dataset is
presented in Baudry et al. (2007). The sample contains around 13 million
price observations collected monthly over the 9 year period 1994:7 to 2003:2.
6See SW equation (33) page 1138.
11Data are available for a range of goods that cover 65% of the French CPI
data. These data are collected for several hundreds of elementary products,
at di⁄erent outlets and at di⁄erent months. An individual observation is a
price quote Pjkt for product j at outlet k at time t (t=1....104). The resulting
dataset is a panel with about 125,000 price quotes each of the 104 months.
The panel is unbalanced since the range of products and the outlets are
changed over time for reasons to do with constructing the CPI. The dataset
also includes CPI weigths, which we use to compute aggregate statistics.
From the panel of prices, we can compute the frequency of price changes,
i.e. the average proportion of prices that do change a given month. On
our sample this weighted average frequency is equal to 19%: this statistic is
the empirical counterpart of the Calvo parameter in discrete time. This is a
monthly statistic: it corresponds to the quarterly frequency of ￿ h = 0:53:
Consistently with the concepts introduced in section 2, we can organize
this data into price spells. These are a sequence of price-quotes at the same
outlet for which the price quoted is the same. There are 2,372,000 price
spells in the panel The weighted average duration of price spells is 7.2
months.7 There are several data issues, which are discussed in Baudry et
al. (2007). Not least is the issue of censored data: we can have left truncated
data, where the beginning of the price spell is not observed. We have right
truncated data, where we do not observe the end of the spell. We also
observe spells which are both right and left truncated: we know neither the
beginning or the end. Truncation results either from the turn-over of products
in stores, and from changes in the sample decided by the statistical institute.
The majority of price spells are uncensored: 57%. There are a lot of left
truncated spells: 27%. The rest are either right truncated or truncated at
both ends. In our empirical analysis below we will focus on the distribution
of spells that are non-left-censored (and disregard other spells). We include
right-truncated spells (i.e. price trajectories that are terminated before the
actual end of sample) because we interpret them as completed spells: for
example we regard product substitution in a store as actually ending a price
spell. There are of course di⁄erent ways of interpreting truncation. However,
we have carried out our analysis using alternative treatments of censoring
and our results were robust.
7The maximum duration in the dataset is 104 months, but this concern a negligible
fraction of price spells. The model simulations that follow use a truncation of the hazard
function at F = 20 quarters. This has no material empirical consequence since less than
0.03 percent of price spells last more than 60 months.
12To characterize the distribution of wage durations, we here rely on a
survey of ￿rms conducted by the French Ministry of Labour, the ACEMO
survey. The ACEMO is unique, owing to its quarterly frequency. Indeed,
while CPI data are collected at the monthly frequency in a very standard-
ized fashion for many countries, data on wages at a higher frequency than
annual are scarce. The ACEMO dataset is analyzed in Heckel, Le Bihan
and Montornes (2008). The ACEMO survey covers establishments with at
least ten employees in the non-farm market sector. Data are collected at the
end of every quarter from a sample of about 38,000 establishments. The
available ￿les span the period from the fourth quarter of 1998 to the fourth
quarter of 2005. The ACEMO survey collects the level of the monthly base
wage, inclusive of employee social security contributions. The data excludes
bonuses, allowances, and other forms of compensations. The survey collects
the wage level of representative employees, for four categories of positions
within the ￿rm: manual workers, clerical workers, intermediate occupations,
managers. Each ￿rm has to report the wages level of up to 12 employees,
representative of the four above mentioned occupations (1 to 3 occupations
in each category). Measurement error is a crucial concern when analyzing
wage data. Here, this concern is attenuated because we have answers by
￿rm to a compulsory survey, rather than self-reported household answers as
in many studies. Furthermore the statistical agency performs some quality
checks. The data set contains some information which allows us to make sure
that the individuals are actually the same from one quarter to another.
The ￿nal dataset contains around 3.7 million wage records and around
1.8 million wage spells. To produce aggregate statistics, data are weighted
using the weight of ￿rms and sectors in overall employment. The average
frequency of wage change is 38% per quarter (￿ hw = 0:38), while the weighted
average duration of spells is 2.0 quarters. Less than 0.1 percent of wage spell
last more than 16 quarters.8
3.2 Hazard function estimates
From the weighted distribution of price and wage durations, we compute sur-
vival function and hazard functions using the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier
estimator. The estimates of the hazard function, the parameters hi of sec-
8In the model simulations we use a truncation of the hazard function at a maximum
duration of Fw = 20 quarters. Virtually no information is thus lost.
13tion 2.2, are presented in Figure 1.9 Importantly, note that the hazard func-
tion for prices relates to monthly data while that for wages relates quarterly
data, consistent with the original frequency of the data. When proceeding to
model-based analysis below, information on price spells will be converted to
the quarterly frequency. As discussed above, these hazard functions where
obtained by discarding left-censored spell and treating right-censored spells
as a price or wage changes, but our results are robust to other assumptions
on censoring.
Insert FIGURE 1
The hazard function for prices is typical of that observed in recent research
with micro price data (see Dhyne et al., 2006, Klenow and Malin, 2010). It
tends to be decreasing over the ￿rst months. This, to some extent, re￿ ects
heterogeneity across sectors in the baseline level of price rigidity (see Alvarez
et al., 2005, FougŁre et al, 2007 for a discussion and empirical investigations).
There is a massive spike at duration 12 months, indicating that a lot of
retailers change their prices after exactly 1 year. The hazard function of wage
is ￿ atter than prices, but clear spikes are seen at duration 4 and 8 quarters.
Overall, the bottomline for both price and wage is that hazard functions are
neither ￿ at (as the simple Calvo model would predict), nor degenerate spikes
at a given duration (as in the Taylor model), but have a more general shape
that mixes patterns of these two cases. We view these observed patterns as a
motivation for using Generalized Taylor and Generalized Contracts to re￿ ect
the estimated distributions.
The two panels of Figure 2 present the distribution of durations, as well
as the Distribution across Firms (i.e. the parameters ￿i and ￿iw de￿ned
in sections 2.1. and 2.3.1), for prices and wages respectively. These ￿gures
convey the same information as the hazard function. They make more vis-
ible that at at given date, the cross-section of spells is dominated by ￿rms
that experience a one-year price or wage contract. For wages, one observes
that there is a substantial mass of short durations, which explain why the
average duration for wages is rather short. This observation does not com-
pletely conform with intuition and requires some quali￿cations. Following
9Due to the huge number of observations, con￿dence intervals are very narrow, thus
are not reported. The ￿gure contains the estimates for the ￿rst 16 months, although we
estimated the hazard function for F = 95 (IS this correctXXX). Details available from
the authors.
14Heckel et al (2008), our interpretation is that this result re￿ ects to a large
extent cases where one single decision of wage increase (say a yearly general
increase in a given ￿rm) is spread out over the year and split up between two
or (more) smaller wage increases10. Informal evidence suggest that a fraction
of French ￿rms actually follow such a policy of gradual implementation of
wage increase. The prevalence of such a pattern is con￿rmed by the empir-
ical analysis of wage-agreement data by Avouyi-Dovi, FougŁre and Gautier
(2010). For a given duration of wages, these types of cases create more
inertia than the one predicted by sticky wage models, because some wage
changes are based on past information (as in Mankiw and Reis, 2002). They
are thus pre-determined and cannot respond to current shocks. While it is
di¢ cult to correct for the degree of such pre-determination in our dataset,
we simply note that our duration measures, and thus our model-based analy-
sis, may tend to underestimate the degree of wage rigidity, and presumably
macroeconomic persistence.
Insert FIGURE 2
4 Implications for monetary policy transmis-
sion.
In this section, we use the distribution of the price and wage data to calibrate
the GT and GC models developed in section 2. We then embed these model in
two alternative macroeconomic models to investigate the implications of GC
and GT behavior for in￿ ation and output persistence following a monetary
policy shock.
4.1 A simple quantity theory model with price or wage-
setting.
We will ￿rst examine the GC and GTE models of prices in a quantity theory
model with labour as the only input of production. This model has the great
advantage of being very simple, because almost all its dynamic properties are
generated by the pricing models alone. DSGE models like the SW model in
10In e⁄ect, this behaviour is similar to the Fischer-like contracts used in sticky-
information models (Mankiw and Reis, 2002).
15contrast are quite complicated with dynamic properties emerging from the
interaction of pricing with many other features of the model. The model we
present is in its log-linearised version (see Ascari 2003, Dixon and Kara 2005
for the derivation from microeconomic foundation).
To model the demand side, we use the Quantity Theory11:
yt = mt ￿ pt
where (pt;yt) are aggregate price and output and mt the money supply. We
model the monetary growth process as an autoregressive process of order one
AR(1) :
mt = mt￿1 + "t
"t = ￿"t￿1 + ￿t
where ￿t is a white noise error term (e⁄ectively a monetary growth shock).
Following CEE we set ￿ = 0:5:
The optimal ￿ exible price p￿
t at period t in all sectors is given by:
p
￿
t = pt + ￿yt (21)
The key parameter ￿ captures the sensitivity of the ￿ exible price to output12.
As discussed in Dixon and Kara (2010), there are a range of calibrated and
estimated values for ￿: for illustrative purposes, we use the "moderate" case
of ￿ = 0:1 as in Mankiw and Reis (2002). As discussed in Ascari (2003) and
Edge (2002), the value of ￿ can be interpreted as resulting from either wage
or price-setting. We therefore report the results using both the French wage
and price data.
Knowing (21) we can use the GTE price-setting equations and price for-
mulae (2);(3);(4):to derive actual price-setting. We can do the same for the
GC price-setting equations (5);(6);(7). To calibrate the model parameters
￿iw and hi; we use the micro data estimates presented above in section 3. In
the case of the Calvo model, we simply take the GC and have a constant haz-
ard ￿ h taken from the data. We now take this simple quantity theory (QT)
11In the case of ￿ = 0 below, the quantity theory can be seen as resulting from an Euler
equation (see Ascari 2003).
12This can be due to increasing marginal cost and/or an upward sloping supply curve
for labour. See for example Walsh (2003, chapter 5) and Woodford (2003, chapter 3).
16framework and subject it to a pure one-o⁄ monetary growth shock ￿t > 0,
which dies away rapidly with ￿ = 0:5. The cumulative e⁄ect of the shock
in the limit is twice the initial shock. The model, as well as that of next
section, is solved and simulations are performed using the DYNARE toolbox
(Juillard, 1996). In Figure 3, we depict the impulse response functions for
output and in￿ ation.
Insert FIGURE 3
There are two main observations to be made. First, in the in￿ ation IRF,
there is no hump shape in either the Calvo or the GCE model, but there
is a hump shape with the GTE. This result con￿rms, in a set-up that uses
data on actual distributions of price durations, the ￿nding of Dixon and
Kara (2010). Second, both the GTE and the GCE predict a more persistent
in￿ ation and output response than the simple Calvo model.
The intuition behind the hump is that in the GTE, ￿rms that are re-
setting their price are less forward looking on average in their pricing decision
than in Calvo. That is because they know exactly how long their spell will
last, and so can ignore what happens after the spell ￿nishes (since they will
be able to choose another price). For example, the ￿rms with one period
spells only look at what is happening in the current period. That means
that they will raise their prices less than ￿rms who have longer spells and
so are more forward looking and anticipate future in￿ ation that will occur
during the spell and hence raise their price by more in anticipation of this.
In the GCE and Calvo framework, all ￿rms that reset their prices have to
look forward F periods, since there is a possibility that their price might last
that long. This means that the Calvo and GCE ￿rms raise their prices most
on impact.
The GC and GTE are more persistent for both in￿ ation and output than
Calvo. The intuition here is that the French price data has a fatter tail of long
spells in the distribution of durations (and the cross-sectional DAF) than is
present in the Calvo distribution. As shown in Dixon and Kara (2005), that
the presence of long-contracts has a disproportionate e⁄ect on the behavior
of aggregate output and in￿ ation due to the strategic complementarity of
prices13.
13See also Carvalho (2006) in the context of sectoral heterogeneity using the Calvo
approach.
174.1.1 Wage rigidity in the QT model.
We can do the same exercise calibrating the Calvo, GC and GT models with
the wage data. We should note however that the wage data does not have
a long fat tail: indeed after 4 quarters, the proportion of long-spells is lower
in the data than in the Calvo distribution. We would therefore expect to see
the Calvo model as no less persistent than the GTE or GC:
In Figure 4, we depict the impulse responses for all three models using
the wage data.
Insert FIGURE 4
As we see, the in￿ ation and output IRFs for the Calvo and GC are very
similar (and indeed both very di⁄erent from the GTE case). There is an
in￿ ation hump for the GTE, with an impact e⁄ect on wage in￿ ation being
less than in the other two cases: but from the second quarter onwards the
e⁄ect on wage in￿ ation is larger. This is mirrored in the output IRF: there
is initially a greater e⁄ect on output under the GTE, but after the third
quarter there is less.
If we consider the simple QT framework, we can see that the nature of the
empirical distribution matters. We have taken two distributions from the
micro-data for the same economy: that of wages and prices. Whilst there are
some qualitative similarities, the exact shape of the distribution matters. In
particular if we take the GC and the GT, they may give rise to similar IRFs
for output (in the case of price-data) or not (wage-data). This suggests that
the micro-evidence is needed to evaluate the respective merits of the models.
4.2 A DSGE model: Smets and Wouters (2003)
In this section, we use the Smets and Wouters (2003) model, a now standard
model of the euro area widely used for monetary policy analysis. We write
it down in its log-linearized form, which is for convenience reported in the
appendix. The SW model is much more complicated than the simple QT
model we have just used. There are many sources of dynamics other than
prices and wages: capital adjustment (and capital utilization), consumer
dynamics with habit formation, and a monetary policy reaction function.
The behavior of the model is the outcome of the interaction of all of these
processes together as it should be in a DSGE model. Hence the e⁄ect
of pricing dynamics is not isolated as in the simple QT framework of the
previous section.
184.2.1 Embedding GT and GC set-up in Smets and Wouters
Our strategy is the following. We are going to alter the structure of both
price and wage rigidity in the model. We ￿rst remove the price and wage
in￿ ation NKPC0s from the SW model: that is equations (32-33) of the
original article. The rest of the model is left as it is. We then replace these
with the nominal price and wage equations we derived in section 2, and de￿ne
price in￿ ation as the di⁄erence in prices ￿t = pt ￿pt￿1 and wage in￿ ation as
￿w
t = wt ￿ wt￿1:
To describe the price-setting decision, we can de￿ne (nominal) marginal
cost in terms of the rental on capital and nominal wages






t is the rental rate of capital and "a
t a productivity shock. Hence, in
log-linear form we have the optimal ￿ ex-price equation
p
￿
t = mct (23)
We can then use (23) to directly implement the GTE price equations (1);(2);(3;)
and also the wage equations (11);(12);(13);(15);(16);(17).
Similarly, we can use (23) to implement the GC price equations (6);(7)
and wage equations (19);(20): To implement the Calvo model, we simply
take the GC model and set the reset-probability constant and equal to ￿ h for
prices and ￿ hw for wages14.
We underline that following our approach of starting from the micro-data
evidence, we remove indexation (which is a strong mechanism for creating
persistence) from the SW model. We can then see how the price and wage
equations without indexation but re￿ ecting the micro-data perform. We do
not seek to re-estimate the SW model in this paper: our purpose is not to
estimate a DSGE model of the Euro area. Rather, we want to illustrate how
easy it is to introduce evidence from the micro-data into a complex DSGE
model such as the widely used SW model. Hence we take the calibrated
or estimated values for parameters directly from the SW paper. For those
parameters that were estimated in SW; we retain the mode of the posterior
distribution for each parameter (values are listed in the appendix).
14There is some approximation here, as we are truncating the Calvo distribution. How-
ever, the di⁄erence is quantitatively negligible: we ran the original code for the SW model
(with the NKPC in terms of price and wage in￿ ation) with zero-indexation and found no
visible di⁄erence.
194.2.2 Monetary policy shock under GT and GC price and wage
contracts.
Figure 5 reports the IRF for in￿ ation and output in the SW model with GT
and GC contracts following a monetary shock. We see that in this far more
complex model, we get pretty much the same conclusions as in the simple
QT model. First, in￿ ation and output are more persistent for the GTE and
GCE than with the Calvo set-up. Second, there is a hump-shaped response
of in￿ ation for the GTE, whilst the GC and Calvo have initial peak impact.
Insert FIGURE 5
The timing of the in￿ ation peak is earlier than in the original SW model:
with the GTE it is 3 quarters, whilst in SW it is 5 quarters. It is however not
surprising that the model is not able to reach the same degree of persistence
as the original model. First, we are not re-estimating the model, and use
a set of auxiliary parameters that were estimated to ￿t the data under the
Calvo-with-indexation assumption. Re-estimating the full model, with the
GTE or GCE assumption on euro area data would probably come closer
to ￿tting the actual response of in￿ ation to monetary policy shock. Second,
we have removed the indexation assumption both for wage and prices: One
of the main roles of indexation is to generate a hump shaped response of
in￿ ation. Overall, the fact that we get a hump with the GTE even in the
complicated SW framework shows that this is a robust result. Conversely,
the fact that the GC does not give us a hump is also shown to be robust.
4.2.3 Technology shock
We also consider the case of a productivity shock and corresponding IRF
in Figure 6. The shock is a persistent but non-permanent increase in total
factor productivity. After the shock, there is an initial decline in marginal
cost leading to a fall in prices and negative in￿ ation for the ￿rst 5 quarters.
This is followed by positive in￿ ation as the shock dies away. Contrasting
with a quantity theory model, but in accordance with the standard Smets
and Wouters model, the long run impact on prices and wages is non-zero:
the speci￿c monetary policy rule employed results in a fall in the level of
prices and wages, of about a third in absolute value of the maximum short-
run e⁄ect. The e⁄ect on output is everywhere positive, peaking at 7 quarters
and very gradually dying away.
20The di⁄erences between the alternative price-setting models depend on
how they balance prices/in￿ ation and output over this path. As in the case
of a monetary shock, the impact e⁄ect on prices is smaller for the GTE than
the models where ￿rms/unions do not know the length of the price spell (GC
and Calvo). However, all three models are quite similar in terms of the shape
and position of the IRF, unlike the case of the monetary shock. This is due to
the fact that the trajectory of the general price level is non-monotonic. In the
GTE economy, the same mecanism as for the monetary policy shock plays a
role in explaining a dampened reaction of the price level. In the case of the
Calvo and GC economies, all price-setters have to consider the likelihood of
a long-price-spell. At a longer horizon however, due to the price level tends
to go back to its initial level, the required increase in price is smaller. As a
result, the impact e⁄ect for both type of models is relatively close.
Insert FIGURE 6
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown how we can take the micro-data on prices
and wages seriously and introduce them directly into our analysis of macro-
economic policy using the standard DGSE models used today. Using the
theoretical framework of Dixon (2009), we have shown how we can take the
estimated hazard function as a representation of the distribution of price-
spell durations in the data and use it to infer the cross-sectional distribution
under the assumption of a steady-state. From these ways of looking at the
micro-data, we can think of price and wage-setting models that are directly
consistent with the micro-data: the Generalized Calvo and Generalized Tay-
lor models of pricing. Also, for the ￿rst time to our knowledge, we show
how we can do this not only for prices or wages on their own but for both
wages and prices. We are able to use French original micro data to calibrate
separately wage and price setting and combine them in a consistent DGSE
approach.
Perhaps the most interesting result we ￿nd is that if we adopt the Gener-
alized Taylor approach in both the output and labour market, we are able to
generate a hump-shaped response of in￿ ation to a monetary shock. This is
not so in the case of the generalized Calvo approach. This generalizes Dixon
and Kara (2010) for an actual distribution of wage and price durations from
21the euro area in a realistic model. In the case of a productivity shock, we
￿nd that all three approaches lead to a quite similar response.
There are of course many ways to move on from this exercise. First, we
might choose to re-estimate the SW model with the wage and price-setting
models derived from the micro-data. The micro-data used here could provide
either calibrated parameters of the pricing block or an initial distribution for
euro area parameters in the context of a Bayesian estimation. However, since
the SW and CEE models were developed with di⁄erent pricing models, it
might well be that we would want to change the structure of the models in
some ways in addition to the pricing part. Second, we could undertake an
optimal policy exercise within this framework. Kara (2010) has conducted
a comparison of optimal policy with a GTE in the simple quantity theory
setting: he ￿nds that the optimal policy with a GTE is similar to that derived
under Calvo pricing. It would be interesting to see how this carries over to
the more complicated SW approach in this paper. These remain for future
work.
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257 Appendix.
7.1 Deriving the reset wage in a GT economy.
Starting from (14), we ￿rst substitute for w￿
t+k using (13), and then substitute










































Hence we can express the optimal reset wage in sector i as a function of

















7.2 The log-linearized Smets-Wouters model and pa-
rameter values.





























qt = ￿(rt ￿ Et￿t+1) +
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿ rkEtqt+1 +
￿ rk





where , b It is investment in log-deviation, qt is the shadow real price of capital,
￿ is the rate of depreciation, ￿ rk is the rental rate of capital. In addition, ’ is
26a parameter related to the cost of changing the pace of investment, and
￿ ful￿lls ￿ =
￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿ rk￿￿1.
Capital accumulation is given by
b Kt = (1 ￿ ￿) b Kt￿1 + ￿b It￿1
Labour demand is given by
nt ￿ b Lt = ￿b wt + (1 +  )b r
K
t + b Kt￿1
Good market equilibrium condition is given by





t + ￿￿ b Kt￿1 + ￿￿ b r
K
t + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)b Lt
The monetary policy reaction function is:
b it = ￿b it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)f￿t + r￿(b ￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t) + rY(b Yt ￿ b Y
P
t )g
+f(r￿￿(b ￿t ￿ b ￿t￿1) + r￿Y((b Yt ￿ b Y
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Note in the paper we focus on the e⁄ects of two shocks: the monetary
policy shock ￿R
t and the technology shock "a
t: The calibration of the parame-
ters is given in Table A.1. below. It is based on the mode of the posterior
estimates, as reported in Smets and Wouters (2003).
27Table A.1
Parameter Value Interpretation
￿ 0.99 Discount rate
￿ 0.025 Depreciation rate
￿ 0.30 Capital share
￿w 0.5 Mark-up wage
’￿1 6.771 Inv. adj. cost
￿c 1.353 Consumption utility elasticity
b 0.573 Habit formation
￿L 2.400 Labor utility elasticity
￿ 1.408 Fixed cost in production
￿e 0.599 Calvo employment
  0.169 Capital util. adj. cost
Reaction function coe¢ cients
r￿ 1.684 to in￿ ation
r￿￿ 0.140 to change in in￿ ation
￿ 0.961 to lagged interest rate
ry 0.099 to the output gap
r￿y 0.159 to change in the output gap
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